United States Soccer And Bob Bradley: New Challenges, New Contract, Same Coach

Bob Bradley is not a more viable coach today than he was June 26. Then, the United States men’s national team had just been eliminated from the World Cup. Bradley certainly seemed to be gone. Jurgen Klinsmann was on television opining on the shortcomings of U.S. Soccer. The public was coming to grips with a second successive elimination by Ghana. Murmurs of U.S. Soccer officials openly discussing Bradley’s departure became urban legend. Even though potential moves to Fulham or Aston Villa proved more agent-talk than actual opportunity, Bradley also seemed willing to go. We were starting to see why a minuscule number of coaches end up staying for more than one World Cup.

Two months later, Bradley has not only survived but been affirmed for four more years, it was announced yesterday. Barring an unexpected downturn in the United States’ performance, Bob Bradley will be on the sidelines at the next World Cup in Brazil, the end of another cycle that’s now destined to be defined by the same debates that have become tiresome and clichéd. Expect four more years of loaded phrases like tactical naivete, leadership skills, poor preparation, and man management. At least, I expect those phrases to appear in my content. I’m already rolling my eyes at what I’ll write.

After four years of an inconclusive tenure, we have little reason to have strong feelings about whether Bradley is the man for the United States. It seems Bradley is a good coach, but in a position that has drawn the interest of at least one world class-manager, it’s still unclear whether Bradley is the best choice. There is a rigidity to his formation and tactics that hints at a lack of imagination, but those choices are possibly a function of a player pool that’s limited and lacks versatility. The U.S. has a stress-inducing tendency to give up the first goal, but that may be the trade-off that has to be accepted for an admirable mental toughness, one that makes the United States one of the scarier teams to play against. The selection and lack of success bringing-in impact players could reflect an inability to develop options or the shallowness of the player pool. After four years of conflicting results and a captivating, healthy debate, we have little clue how to decide these debates.

It seems U.S. Soccer is no different than us, with Bradley’s contract extension more a reflection of a conflicted organization than a federation getting behind its coach. There were strong views at the top of U.S. Soccer’s hierarchy that were looking to replace Bradley, but like any large corporation, U.S. Soccer is not monolithic. Just as within the supporters’ group, Bradley’s always had strong, counter-balancing support within the federation. That tension between factions created a stand-still - a waiting game - when the coach’s future needed to be addressed. If Bradley took another job, the two factions would not have to come to an accord. When it became clear Bradley was not going to get a better job, U.S. Soccer’s decision-making process produced the same result as most unresolvable conflicts: a risk-averse solution that defaulted to the status quo.

While a risk adverse solution runs counter to the espoused ambition of U.S. Soccer, but that doesn’t mean Bob Bradley is a bad coach; however, if the U.S. goes through another World Cup cycle like 2010’s, I suspect fans will become disillusioned. Fans were disproportionately disappointed after being eliminated by Ghana, regardless of the fact that the Black Stars are probably a more talented team. That disappointment reflects expectations that are raised, perhaps unfairly so. Fans, players, and federation want to make a leap, become a true soccer power. The question is whether Bradley is the person to navigate that leap. If you look at the United States’ Confederations Cup run, you see the hints of a coach capable of doing so, but if you look at inconsistency in CONCACAF qualifying, the players Bradley’s brought through, and his choices of formation and tactics, you see a coach better suited for maintenance than ambition.

Still, the Bob Bradley that leads the United States into 2014 may not be the same as the one which led the States into South Africa. The decisions Bradley made in preparation for 2010 could very well change when a different set of challenges present themselves before 2014.

And as those challenges surface, we will get a better idea of how Bob Bradley answers the following questions, answers which will define years five through eight of his tenure:

Will moving forward compromise what Bradley’s already accomplished? I can’t think of a another team that’s as good at playing from behind as the United States. Though we saw this in the World Cup (where the U.S. turned-around deficits in three-of-four matches), this characteristic was also in place at the end of qualifying. It’s the one facet of the States’ play that threatens any team in the world, a facet that has not been present throughout the history of the program. Bradley seems to have cultivated this mentality. If the U.S. is to continue climbing the world’s soccer ladder, they’ll need to retain and augment this toughness. For Bradley, developing this mindset is his greatest accomplishment - the corner stone upon which to build.

Can Bradley solve the start-up problem? The U.S. fell behind in three World Cup matches. They did the same in six of the ten matches in The Hex, the last round of CONCACAF qualifying. Considering the U.S. bills itself as the best team in the region, falling behind to inferior competition is worrisome. You could argue that this is ultimately inconsequential. After all, it’s the score at the end of the match that matters, right? Perhaps, but how would the World Cup matches against England, Slovenia and Ghana have turned-out if the United States had not exhibited their tendency toward early mistakes? Bottom line: these are goals that seem preventable with a change in approach. There is not reason the United States should seen an entirely different, inferior team at the beginning a match.
Does Bradley have more than one formation in his arsenal? The 4-4-2 is becoming axiomatic, as is his deployment’s huge gap between central midfielders and forwards. Link-up play has become hypothetical, possibly a stylistic sacrifice Bradley’s willing to make. Just because that gap is problematic does not mean it’s something more than the consequence of a conscious trade-off. But even if you give Bradley the benefit of the doubt, it seems a stretch to think an identical 4-4-2 deployment is the best choice against every team. Would the United States have fared better against Slovenia, Algeria, or Ghana had they better matched their opponent’s approach? Does Bradley have another option in his strategic repertiore? Or, does the U.S. lack the personnel to promote that flexibility? Which begs the question:

Is Bradley the right man to bring through the next generation of players? Consider the new players - the players who were not in the set-up when Bradley took-over - who meaningfully contributed in South Africa. We’re talking about Altidore, Bradley, Bornstein, Clark, DeMerit, Edu, Feilhaber, and Findley. That’s a solid group, but aside from Michael Bradley, it’s a group of players that failed to show they should be starting for an aspiring soccer power. That problem’s compounded by the list of players who will be 30-or-over (or outright gone) by Brazil: Bocanegra, Cherundolo, Clark, DeMerit, Dempsey, Donovan, Onyewu. Bob Bradley is going to have to engineer a revitalization of the senior team’s talent pool, but based on the last four years, his ability to do so is an open question. Given the lack of sure-things coming through the youth ranks, finding new players to contribute in Brazil will be Bradley’s biggest challenge.