What I want to do with my Chalk Talk every week is try to find unusual or unique schemes on offense or defense that have been effective for one or more of the NFL teams. Those are usually the most enjoyable plays to break down. They also seem to be the most entertaining to the people who read them.
What makes the Broncos offense so effective?
The Denver Broncos found the perfect blend of timing, precision and creativity for their offensive playbook. A retired NFL defensive end looks at what makes it so different.
Steven Bisig-USA TODAY Sports
The problem is that some weeks there just aren't many unusual, unique, and effective schemes when you go back and watch the film. Or, the team using the scheme that catches my eye happens to be the team whose plays I broke down just the week prior, which is the case today. I argued back and forth in my head about whether to go with the Broncos' plays again this week, but I can't help it if they call and run dope stuff every week and most of the other teams don't.
What is important to me is that I can use these plays to both entertain and educate you as I fill you in on how and why they worked. I think these next two schemes the Broncos ran on offense at the end of their loss to the Seahawks on Sunday to help them come all the way back to tie the game in regulation will certainly fit the bill.
Let’s start with this new, to me at least, version of a wide receiver screen that the Broncos unveiled with 6:07 left in the game, down 17-12.
This was conceptually dope because the Broncos found a way to get their blockers in place on a screen down field without getting a penalty because those blockers are not offensive linemen. They also found a way to time it out so that it wasn’t an illegal block by the wide receivers because none of them made contact with a Seahawks defender until after the ball is already thrown.
Think about that for a moment, have you ever even considered how a coach figures out the timing of blocks? The reason that you know they thought about the timing is because of who is assigned to block which Seahawks defender.
Let me explain. Wes Welker is is on the top of the screen with another wide receiver. The red arrow going away from his body shows the path he is going to run on this screen. It is a very shallow crossing route because he can't afford to have his progress impeded by one of the Seahawks linebackers trying to jam him or it would throw the whole timing of the play off.
The black line is going away from Broncos wide receiver Demaryius Thomas; he bypasses Seahawks linebacker Bobby Wagner who is lined up directly across from him and heads down field towards Seahawks cornerback Richard Sherman who is lined up well off of the ball.
The yellow line extends away from tight end Julius Thomas and he is going to run right behind Demaryius Thomas and head inside to block Seahawks safety Kam Chancellor.
The blue line extends away from running back Montee Ball. He’ll end up blocking Wagner with outside leverage.
On the next shot, you can see Welker in the red circle. He has successfully avoided any jams and is about to receive the football. Look at the white circle showing quarterback Peyton Manning releasing the ball. That's key because as you look at the black, yellow and blue circles you see that none of those Broncos skill position players have made contact on their block as of yet. That makes these picks all legal.
Because of who they were all assigned to and the timing of it, those skill guys all had relatively easy blocks. All Demaryius Thomas has to do is run at Sherman. The corner is dropping back, thinking pass first, and ends up 20 yards from the ball. Julius Thomas has leverage on Chancellor by alignment, so all he has to do is basically shield him and keep him stuck inside. Because Wagner has Ball in coverage, it takes him a minute to even understand what is going on, and by that time, he's also been blocked inside.
Up until this point in the game, passing yardage had been hard to come by for the Broncos, especially on any screen plays. This was a pretty easy 13-yard gain for them.
In fact, the Broncos liked the result so much that later on in the same drive, with 3:40 left in the game, they ran it again and just flipped the formation. Everyone in the colored circles up above basically had the same blocking assignments. Welker ran the same shallow crossing route. I also put a white circle around the football to make it clear that the ball is in the air before the blockers make contact with any Seahawks defenders.
Welker wound up with 15 yards this time, and the play was perfectly legal.
I think maybe a few offensive coordinators around the league, especially those facing the Seahawks this season, might want to take notes.
The pick play drive I described above didn’t end with any points; Manning threw an interception to kill the drive. However, I do believe it boosted the offense’s confidence because they had moved quickly down the field, all the way to the Seahawks’ 24-yard line before the interception. Confident or not, the Broncos had to score quickly after they got the ball with 59 seconds left at their own 20-yard line needing eight points just to tie the score. So, they broke out the scissors.
Anybody that has played Madden has likely seen the scissors route drawn up. I’m sure some folks have other names for it, but the basic concept is that two receivers line up on one side together, run straight down the field and exchange lanes. Sometimes the outside receiver who becomes the inside receiver will run a slant or a post to further draw coverage away from the inside receiver who eventually becomes the outside receiver.
This is the basic concept the Broncos used to score that last touchdown with 24 seconds to spare. I’m sure that I won’t be the only analyst to draw up and explain this play, but I also want to explain why they worked against the Seahawks.
Demaryius Thomas is up top, lined up as the outside receiver with the yellow line extending away from him. He’s running a deep post route.
Emmanuel Sanders s the inside receiver, with the red line. He ran what is essentially a wheel route down the field. He takes off 10 yards before allowing Demaryius Thomas to cross in front of him on the post, and then he runs an out-and-up route.
The Seahawks like to play a lot of single-high safety. Sometimes, single-high safety means they are playing a cover 3 zone where the deep safety and each corner has one third of the deep part of the zone. They also like to use a single-high safety when they play man-to-man. It can get tricky at times. Here, I circled Chancellor who will end up being the deep safety on this play. I also circled Byron Maxwell and Sherman to show the cornerbacks. Sherman is on the inside receiver and a linebacker is lined up outside of him, so it's probably safe to assume that they're playing man-to-man.
That helps the Seahawks this time because nickel corner, Marcus Burley, actually stayed on Sanders the whole way through the wheel route, or at least tried to, instead of turning him over like he would have in zone. Sanders got separation, and Chancellor was a half a step late getting over the top of him. Peyton's pass was a little too soft forcing Sanders to wait for half a second. By the time he had his hands on the ball, Chancellor knocked the hell out of him, and he wasn't able to hold on.
However, the Broncos took note that the concept itself worked, even though Sanders dropped the pass.
Here’s the real reason why it worked. Scroll back up the shot before the snap and notice where Peyton is lined up. Now look at where he ends up before he throws the ball. How did this happen? The Seahawks suddenly thought it would be a GREAT idea to use one of their defensive tackles to spy instead of rushing Manning, which is what had been working all day.
On this play, the right defensive end decided to go way inside to try to account for the defensive tackle that dropped out. That allowed Peyton to drive damn near to the numbers away from pressure to deliver the ball down field.
I talked about timing before. The problem for the offense on this play is that for it to work well, it takes a looooooonnnnnnng time for those routes to cross down field. Way more time than the Seahawks pass rush would normally allow.
Since I hate the three-man rush with a passion, I couldn’t have been happier about the ultimate outcome of this drive. That’s karma for your ass, jack. Next time, keep rushing four!
But I digress.
The Broncos were so convinced that the concept itself was money, they ran the same exact thing on the next play from scrimmage. The Broncos caught a break that time, because I believe the Seahawks were playing zone.
After the flat defender goes to the flat in zone, they don’t generally stay with a route that is going deep. The corner to that side is supposed to come off the post, turning that over to the deep safety, and play over the top of the wheel route. That sounds good in theory, but on the field, cornerbacks often times get locked in on the outside receiver if he runs ten or more yards up the field. That means there is nobody to cover the wheel route deep.
Once again, the Seahawks allowed this because they used a defensive tackle to spy. This time Manning stepped right up through the void where the dropping defensive tackle should have been and bought enough time to let the route combination develop. Then he made the throw down the field.
By the time the ball gets there neither Chancellor nor Maxwell are close enough to affect the catch. That was a 42-yard completion that took the Broncos from their own 20 to the Seahawks 38-yard line.
Then for some crazy reason they tried to do some other shit. After a spike on first down, Manning missed on a short pass to running back Ronnie Hillman. Then he hit Demaryius Thomas on an out route for 12 yards. With 24 seconds left from the Seattle 26-yard line, somebody said screw it and they went scissors again.
This time the wrinkle was that the inside receiver was actually tight end Jacob Tamme, same concept. It also looks like they caught the Seahawks in cover 3 again.
Look at all that room Manning has to throw the ball because the Seahawks again decided to drop one of the defensive tackles. Karma, I tell ya!
The Broncos hit pay dirt using basically the same play for the third time on this drive. It worked because Maxwell never adjusted and they gave Manning too much time to throw. As much as I do like this concept, I have major doubts as to how effective it would be against a team that can really rush the passer.
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