Let’s set the scene: the precocious Thunder had the ball, down by a deuce with 15 seconds to go in the fourth quarter of Game 2. After inbounding the ball, they found Kevin Durant off a down screen, who misfired on a semi-contested three-pointer over the outstretched arms of Ron Artest. Check out the play here. While the Thunder still had a chance to force overtime after Pau Gasol clanked one of his subsequent free throws, the question remains: did Kevin Durant make the right choice going for the win rather than for the tie?
Should Kevin Durant Have Gone For The Tie In Game 2 Of The Lakers-Thunder Series?
The conventional wisdom among hoops cognoscenti is that you want to “extend the game” -- in other words, go for the higher percentage shot and play for the tie. But, as is oftentimes the case, the conventional wisdom is wrong; the higher percentage play isn’t necessarily the best choice at the end of the game. Let’s explain (warning: a very small amount of math involved).
Basketball statheads generally divide the game into three segments: the opening, the midgame, and the endgame (they’ve borrowed these terms from chess, so you know it’s nerdy). The basic idea is that teams spend the opening feeling their opponents out, figuring out what works best. Then they pursue their optimal strategy during the midgame, trying to maximize the points they score per possession, and minimize the number they allow. I know, I know -- so far we haven’t said much more than: teams try to outscore their opponents. Hardly ground-breaking stuff. But the difference is when we get to that nebulous period known as the endgame. Because the object is winning, a team’s most efficient strategy isn’t always the best option; sometimes a riskier strategy (i.e., taking more three-pointers) gives a team a better chance to win when the clock is running down. This is all pretty intuitive.
So how does this apply to Durant’s decision to go for the win at the end of Game 2? Let’s say the chance the Thunder win is W, the chance he makes a two-point shot is X, and the chance he makes a three-point shot is Y (let’s ignore the chance the Lakers score before the end of regulation since it would be the same in both cases). If Durant goes for the tie, the odds the Thunder win are the chances he makes a two-pointer AND the chance the Thunder win in overtime. That’s W=X*1/2 (in general, the odds of a team winning in overtime are even). Conversely, if Durant takes a shot from downtown, the odds of a Thunder win are simply the chances he makes a three-pointer, or W=Y.
Comparing these two expressions, and solving for when the two-point option is better than the three-point one, we get X>2Y. In other words, Durant should only take a two-point shot if he’s more than twice as likely to make it as he is to make a three-pointer, due to the fact that going to overtime is only a 50-50 proposition. Now that doesn’t mean Durant should force up a three-pointer into the teeth of the opposing defense, but rather that a team’s best option is to diagram a play that will get one of their better shooters an open look from distance (and preferably from the corner). After all, even if a team shoots 50% on twos and 30% on threes (and that’s generally overestimating teams’ proficiencies at making close shots and underestimating their chances from deep), they’ll end up winning more often by eschewing the safer play and putting it up from three.
So this is all a long-winded way of saying that Durant’s instincts to go for the jugular were correct. Of course, a basketball savant like Durant doesn’t need math to prove this point; he simply thought he’d make the shot.











