Since the first fast guy was invented in 1910, baseball has been obsessed with converting fast guys into center fielders. It makes a lot of sense. Stick the fast guy in center field, where there’s more territory to cover, and watch him zip around like a labradoodle, catching baseballs like he’s been doing his whole life. In this sense, it is completely rational for the Mariners to trade for Dee Gordon and expect him to learn how to play center field.
Dee Gordon can definitely play center field, unless he can’t
The Mariners aren’t taking a huge risk with the Dee Gordon trade, but they’re still taking one.


In another sense, this is a huge risk. Jerry Dipoto is McGyvering a bazooka out of a tailpipe and a steering wheel knob, and I’m very, very much into it. From a distance. And not with my team.
History is filled with successful conversions to center field. The most recent success story was Billy Hamilton, who moved from the infield to center and became one of baseball’s most brilliant defenders. Chris Taylor converted so quickly that he was starting in center in time for the World Series. Historical success stories include Hall of Famers Robin Yount and Craig Biggio.
This can work. I might go a step further and suggest this is likely to work.
However, since the first fast guy was invented, there also has been a strange corollary: the fast guy who is completely incapable of playing center field. The obvious one is Tim Raines, one of baseball’s finest all-around players, who, for whatever reason, just never felt comfortable in center.
After a one-year experiment, he shifted back to left and stayed there for the rest of his career. Carl Crawford never took to the position, either. There were usually extenuating circumstances that might not apply to Gordon — established center fielders blocking them, weaker arms, et cetera — but there never has been a guarantee that the fastest player on the field makes the best center fielder.
What most of the experiments, successful or otherwise, have in common is that they were low-risk based on in-house options. The players in question were already employed by the teams that converted them. They gave it a whirl in spring training or for an in-season emergency, but there were fallback positions.
Trea Turner was used in center field when an emergency arose, and he moved back to shortstop when it made sense. Yount and Biggio were moved because of age and the rigors of the middle infield, but it’s not like room wouldn’t have been made for them if they couldn’t handle center. These teams were using what they had in a creative way.
The Mariners traded for Dee Gordon, and there is no safety net. There is no moving Robinson Cano, no moving Jean Segura. Even if Gordon’s bat played in an outfield corner, which it probably doesn’t, the Mariners don’t have a lot of holes there, either. This has to work. He costs plenty of money to play center field now, and there isn’t another option. There aren’t a lot of comparable moves in recent memory, where a team trades or signs a player entering his 30s to play a position he’s never played before.
There is one that comes to mind, even if it’s an imperfect comparison. Alfonso Soriano stole 41 bases for the Nationals the year before the Cubs signed him, and while he wasn’t as fast as Gordon is now, he was still plenty fast.
Here’s an article that was written three weeks into his Cubs career:
“I don’t think I’m going to have problems,” Soriano said. “I want to make sure I’m ready for opening day.”
He was ready for Opening Day. And he lasted 12 games in center field, then he was replaced by Jacque Jones, who had played 14 games in center over the previous six years but was at least an outfielder. The experiment was a bust immediately. The good news is that the Cubs had a backup plan. They were at least anticipating the possibility.
When Piniella was asked if Soriano reminded him of any center fielder, he paused for 15 seconds. Eventually, he concocted an answer.
“Let’s hope,” Piniella said, “he reminds me of Mike Cameron by the time the summer is over.”
That doesn’t advance my point. I just wanted it in here.
Again, Soriano was athletic but not as quick and springy as Gordon. Still, the larger point is that speed doesn’t necessarily translate into catches in center. Soriano could have beat Aaron Rowand in a foot race back in 2007, and he could probably beat him in a foot race now. But Rowand had the first step and the routes in his prime.
Take Raines, for another example. He moved to center field when Andre Dawson’s knees were too battered by the Olympic Stadium turf, and he wasn’t worried about the challenges:
Actually, I think playing center is easier. Everything is in front of you and most of the time the ball comes straight without those slices you get in left and right. And there’s more room to work with out there.
The next year, he moved back to left field to make room for Herm Winningham. Raines wasn’t bad out there; he just wasn’t comfortable. Speed didn’t help him with his routes or first steps. And, again, he was an outfielder to begin with. Gordon will be 30, and he’s never played a major league game outside of the infield.
We can go back to Turner for a moment, too. He was fine in center, for the most part. He had speed and range, and he had a strong arm. Still, along the way, he showed his inexperience with the Nationals Park dimensions at exactly the wrong time:
That’s not a clip of Turner not being fast enough or unathletic enough. It’s also not a play that suggests Turner wouldn’t have developed into a fantastic, all-world center fielder. It’s just him using his speed to get to where he thought an outfield wall was in an elimination game, then realizing the actual wall was a few feet farther away. Center field is hard if you’ve never played it, everyone.
I don’t have a similar clip for Ian Desmond, who was fine, just fine, in center after he was acquired by the Rangers to convert at the same age Gordon is now, though. This can work. This probably will work. Look at how fast this guy is:
But I’m fascinated because it doesn’t have to work, and there’s no easy way for the Mariners to get out of the $30 million commitment if they realize that, uh oh, Gordon freezes for a beat on every ball hit directly at him.
JERRY DIPOTO: Man, Gordon’s scuffling out there. I need to fix this.
DIPOTO: [executes 30 separate trades that end with Cano and Gordon back on the Mariners after being traded away to six different teams]
DIPOTO: Poof!
DIPOTO: Wait.
DIPOTO: Ah, hell.
It will probably work. The risk is understandable. The logic is sound. But the Mariners have put themselves in a position where Dee Gordon has to learn how to play center fielder to be useful to them. They’ll be fine.
But what if they aren’t?
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