The easy way to explain the Cavaliers' 30-point victory in Game 3 of the NBA Finals is that they played hard and the Warriors didn't. Unsurprisingly, that was the immediate talking point of both head coaches after the game.
LeBron James guarding Draymond Green changed everything for the Cavaliers
How did the Cavaliers disrupt the Warriors’ offensive flow? By flipping the matchups and sticking LeBron on Draymond Green.
"The only change is just playing hard, I think competing for 48 minutes," Tyronn Lue said.
“This was about one team being emotionally fired up and angry about being down 2-0, and another team being comfortable,” Steve Kerr added.
They’re right, but that also perpetuates a false dichotomy. Read too much into these lines, and you’d think playing harder alone caused a 63-point turnaround.
Playing hard is extremely important, but the reality is more complicated. Neither coach wanted to reveal schematic changes publicly to keep their competitive advantage, but there was one important schematic change that helped facilitate the Cavaliers’ stronger effort.
They put LeBron James on Draymond Green.
The effect of this switch allowed the Cavaliers to mirror the Thunder's approach to slowing the Warriors in the conference finals. OKC coach Billy Donovan flipped his forward matchups, slotting Kevin Durant, the normal small forward, on Green and Serge Ibaka, the regular power forward, on Harrison Barnes or Andre Iguodala.
The main purpose was to switch the Stephen Curry/Green pick and roll, the league's most unstoppable play during the regular season. However, the move also simplified the Thunder's other assignments. Green is the playmaking hub of Golden State's attack even when he's not directly involved in the play. He is usually faster and more skilled than his counterpart, and that kick-starts the Warriors' attack.
But by shifting a wing player as athletic and long as Durant onto him, the Thunder negated that advantage. Barnes and Iguodala are useful players, of course, but their off-ball movement is easier for the rest of the team to manage.
The Cavaliers were reluctant or unable to mimic this approach in the first two games and were clubbed over the head with backcuts and easy buckets. Since Green is the hub of the Warriors’ early half-court actions, the Cavaliers were caught behind the 8-ball right away and failed to catch up.
But with LeBron on Green, that initial switch was immediate. That disrupted the flow of Golden State’s offense.
Green hit the jumper, but that’s not the kind of possession the Warriors want.
The Warriors, of course, force defenses to make many other decisions in the course of one possession, both on and off the ball. At their best, they slowly wear out defenders used to finding resting spots, which leads to mental fatigue that causes breakdowns and open shots.
At the same time, the right defensive scheme, combined with the ferocious effort Lue described, can turn that strategy into a Jenga tower. Disrupt the right piece, and the rest of the offense may come crashing down.
In the Warriors’ case, that one piece is Draymond Green. Notice how James’ speed recovering to this Green pick and slip throws off the timing of Golden State’s other movement, making it easier for James’ teammates to cover up.
That sharp defensive possession only happens because James is directly involved right off the bat. He was in the background too much in Games 1 and 2, which caused his focus to wane. By slotting James on Green and asking him to mimic the Durant role, Lue found the right way to trigger productive defensive energy from his star.
Because when locked in, James is just as capable as Durant, if not more, in containing Curry. Game 3 proved it.
We should pause to note the elephant in the room: Kevin Love's absence. Though the Cavaliers could have flipped their forward matchups with Love healthy, it's a lot easier to stomach when Richard Jefferson is James' frontcourt partner. At one point in Game 2, the Cavaliers actually tried hiding Love on Iguodala, but the Warriors quickly hunted down Love and exposed him. That was the end of that experiment.
Jefferson, on the other hand, can at least hold his own in a similar situation. More importantly, he and James can swap assignments during code red transition situations. In Games 1 and 2, the Cavaliers spent too much time calling out switches on the break and not enough time actually executing them properly. They spent too long considering the fear of an eventual mismatch involving Love, Kyrie Irving or anyone else, and indecision is death against the Warriors.
But because Jefferson was in for Love, the Cavaliers made it easier to simply match up with the Warrior closest to them. That closed the openings the Warriors exploited in the first two games.
None of this works without proper effort, but the domino effect of Love's injury and James' matchup switch made it easier for the Cavaliers to play harder. Irving and Tristan Thompson in particular were significantly more engaged defensively in this game. Both had a hand in completely neutralizing Curry; they held his scoring down and prevented him from acting as the world's best decoy. They stepped up.
Yet their jobs were also easier because James took the Green assignment. James was the coverage linebacker spying the quarterback or covering a dangerous pass-catching tailback. That meant Thompson — a secondary player executing zone coverage in this analogy — had less to worry about. That simplified his switch-or-don't-switch reads.
Irving, meanwhile, could fight defensively knowing that James or Jefferson could cover for him if he made or mistake or simply needed to switch. Sometimes, that luxury causes a player to give less effort. In Irving’s case, though, it provided confidence to move continuously and not worry as much about getting beat. If everyone else is moving fluidly, so too can Irving.
That’s why Irving was able to fight over screens like he rarely does and stay with the MVP.
The challenge will be greater in Game 4. Curry should be better, if only because he can't possibly be any worse. The Warriors have plenty of counters in their arsenal to facilitate sharper ball and player movement, whether they're lineup changes (I'd expect much more of the Death Lineup and less Andrew Bogut in Game 4) or more specific schematic adjustments. Love's possible return, while welcome in some capacities, will be an interesting challenge for Cleveland's defense.
But the lesson of Cleveland’s Game 3 turnaround is that effort and scheme function together, not apart. The Cavaliers’ adjustments allowed Cleveland’s energy to be more productive, and their heightened effort allowed the schematic changes to translate from whiteboard to reality. They are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they share in a symbiotic relationship.
That’s good news for the Cavaliers’ chances. Perhaps they’ve finally discovered a formula that allows them to compete.











