Rudy Gobert didn’t need the ball to crush Team USA in the FIBA World Cup

When we ranked the best NBA players at the 2019 FIBA World Cup, we put three guys over the top Team USA player. Two were obvious: NBA MVP Giannis Antetokounmpo and Denver Nuggets point center Nikola Jokic. The third was Rudy Gobert, the giant Utah Jazz center that isn’t nearly the offensive force those other two are, but more than makes up for it with his dominant defense and offensive shadow impact.

Thanks to those two qualities, a Team USA that fielded actual NBA players tasted competitive international defeat for the first time in 13 years.

There were several keys to France’s 89-79 quarterfinal victory over the Americans, but all roads lead back to Gobert. Unsurprisingly, his work protecting the rim neutralized the U.S.’ drive-heavy offensive attack, especially in the fourth quarter and especially in the final minutes. But Gobert also showed why he’s such a dominant offensive force, even though he rarely does much more than catch and finish.

Let’s watch some of these blocks again.

Sheesh. Fucking sheesh. That last one in particular. It’s easy to criticize Donovan Mitchell for thinking he could use the rim as a shield on a reverse layup, but look at the way Gobert’s right arm goes from one side of the rim to the other. You can only do this justice in slow motion.

Holy crap.

Team USA’s strategy to account for Gobert was logical enough: spread the floor, make him defend in space, and try to jitterbug around him via dribble drives or quick attacks off the catch. It’s the same approach NBA teams use to pull Gobert away from the rim, the real estate he owns. I can’t fault Gregg Popovich for the tactics he used. They just didn’t work well enough in the end, even after Popovich ditched Myles Turner and went small.

Part of that is because the spacing in FIBA is more compressed than it is in the NBA. As I noted in explaining Antetokounmpo’s struggles, great rim protectors don’t have to slide as far laterally to stop drives to the hoop. Not only can they sit in the lane for longer than three seconds, but the shorter three-point line means they can more easily stand near the hoop and still close out to the three-point line.

But Gobert was also up for the task even when the U.S. tried to move him around and then attack him. He jumped up high enough to contest pull-up jumpers on high ball screens, the kind of plays that can vex him in the NBA. When the U.S. tried throwing him off-balanced, Gobert balanced his responsibilities nicely.

The most important moment of the game came with 8:11 left in the fourth quarter. Kemba Walker hit a stepback jumper to put the Americans up seven, and it looked like they were going to break the dam. Their small lineup had neutralized France’s pick-and-roll game by switching across all five positions, erasing the sturdy screens Gobert had been setting to free Evan Fournier.

After that timeout, France made a critical strategy adjustment. They ditched the rest of their offense, spread the floor, and ran high pick-and-roll with Fournier and Gobert every time down. The score from that point on: France 24, USA 7.

Why did this adjustment work so well? During their third-quarter surge, the U.S. managed to turn Gobert into a post player, which is not his strength. Guards fronted Gobert so he couldn’t catch it, and wings helped off their own men to prevent easy catches at the basket.

This allowed the U.S. to accomplish two objectives in one. Switching at the point of attack removed whatever space Gobert’s screens provided to France’s guards, while pinching in off other players made it difficult for France to wedge the ball inside when Gobert rolled to the basket. It’s no accident Team USA turned a 10-point deficit into a seven-point lead.

In response, France coach Vincent Collet spread the floor with perimeter players and moved all pick-and-rolls to the middle of the floor. Suddenly, those U.S. wings that were pinching in to help when a guard switched onto Gobert couldn’t do so. And suddenly, the two-on-two battle that France had been winning against U.S. defenders all game became a two-on-two battle again.

When the U.S. tried helping off the wing to neutralize Gobert’s rolling, France’s perimeter players made timely cuts into open space.

And when the U.S. switched and fronted Gobert effectively, France simply moved their perimeter players away from the basket to take those extra U.S. defenders away.

In effect, this strategy shift returned the tempo back in France’s favor. During the first half, France ground the game to a halt using Fournier and Gobert in the pick-and-roll. They read Team USA’s coverage, then used Gobert’s screening ability to find the solution. Whenever the U.S. went under or cheated one way, Gobert flipped the direction of the screen to give Fournier space. This was especially effective against Turner, who doesn’t like to leave the paint on defense.

When Gobert did roll hard to the basket, it sucked in the U.S. defense and opened opportunities for other French players.

Going small solved that problem, and looked like it’d neutralize Gobert’s offensive impact. But thanks to a brilliant strategy adjustment by Collet, France was able to turn Gobert back into the rim-running, bone-crushing magnet that brilliantly took advantage of Team USA’s lack of size.

Gobert may not have been posting up and dunking on fools, nor was he driving and finishing like a great perimeter player. But make no mistake: he was the single French player that most threatened the U.S. defense. The only difference between him and a more traditional offensive force is that he did it without the ball.

In a FIBA style of play where being the biggest bully matters most, Gobert was the biggest bully. In the end, that trumped the U.S.’ speed advantage.